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1 Introduction
Transforming the security sector in Latin
America has been one of the most challenging
tasks following democratisation in the region. As
Chillier and Varela suggest in this IDS Bulletin,
after approximately 20 years of democratic rule,
institutional reforms of the military and police
apparatus have been difficult to implement in
certain countries, resisted in others, and left
untouched in several cases.
The promise of democratisation did not translate
automatically into improvement of material
social conditions or protection against abuses by
state agents. Indeed, the evolution of political
and civil rights in Latin America over the last 20
years does not show a linear relationship
between the diffusion of the rule of law and the
actual protection of citizens’ rights. In this sense,
the progressive adoption of international norms
since the 1940s, the expansion of advocacy
networks since the mid-1960s, and
democratisation processes since the 1980s have
not automatically resulted in an improvement of
the quality of life of citizens living in the region
(Agüero and Stark 1998).
According to the Freedom House Survey on
political and civil rights, an increasing number of
Latin American countries have seen
improvements in political rights. From 1976 to
2001, the number of countries where political
rights are fully respected increased from four to
eleven. However, if we consider respect for civil
liberties, which includes protection from the
abuse of state power, in 1976 four countries
enjoyed full respect for civil liberties, whereas in
2001 only five countries observed a full respect of
such rights. In other words, while citizens in
Latin America can currently elect authorities
fairly and freely, they still suffer mistreatment
and abuse at the hands of authorities. Police
abuse, discrimination, violence in the streets,
and violence at home against women are
continuous sources of difficulty within the
region.
While new democratic authorities do not illegally
detain, torture, or make people disappear, police
violence is a daily practice that remains
unchecked in several ‘democratic’ countries
(Méndez et al. 1999). This does not signify the
absence of change. In fact, some governments in
the region have attempted to reform security
institutions, provide new legal frameworks to
protect citizens’ rights, and establish
mechanisms of accountability such as
ombudsmen and citizens review boards.
However, such initiatives have been strongly
resisted by security institutions, are difficult to
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implement, or have resulted in increasing the
power of those in charge of security issues.
Thus, while social actors are more
interconnected locally and internationally than
ever in demanding the protection of citizens’
rights, certain domestic forces preempt such
influence and inhibit substantive changes. Hence
we need to observe the conditions inhibiting
improvements in human rights and the reform of
security apparatuses. What are the factors
explaining the gap between commitment to
international human rights norms in most Latin
American countries and the actual performance
of governments in terms of protecting citizens’
rights? And why do centre-leftist governments
not advance serious institutional reforms of the
security apparatus, especially following legacies
of brutal military rule?
The lack of advancement in both the actual
protection of citizens’ rights and institutional
democratic reforms of the security sector is due
to a complex and intertwined set of political
conditions. In the next section, such conditions
will be explained along with recommendations
for and challenges presented to civil society
actors.
2 Protecting rights in a democratic setting
Advancing reforms and transformation of the
security sector in a democratic setting
necessarily requires examining a three-fold set
of conditions: (a) the political context
(institutional and political constraints and
opportunities); (b) social perceptions and
demands on security; and (c) the institutional
development of the security forces. While
policymakers and academics focus on studying
and reforming the security apparatus, I argue
that we also need to look at a broader set of
incentives and constraints within the political
system.
2.1 Political context: institutional and political
constraints and opportunities
Lack of security sector reform in Latin America
has been attributable to the strength of the
armed forces and the police after transitions to
democracy and links with powerful sectors of
society. According to this view, violence in Latin
America can be explained in part by the uneven
distribution of power among those who control
resources of power (the means of production, the
state apparatus) and the rest of society. For
instance, economic elites may influence
policymakers to repress workers who are not
willing to accept new rules of the game. Those
elites may influence policymakers to punish
those who attempt to violate private property as
well. In this context, security forces – including
the police and the armed forces – would carry
out their assigned roles by repressing those
groups and individuals who threaten the elite.
Even though this structural, power-based
analysis highlights an important feature of social
relations – social actors’ distribution of power –
it provides an incomplete picture of the problem.
Usually, this approach portrays institutions as an
equilibrating solution to social actors’ conflicting
interests; in other words, institutions reflect the
power distribution among different groups in
society. For example, power-based analyses
consider the police to be a reflection of the
interests of the powerful. But even though
security institutions may reflect an initial
distribution of power, they incorporate historical
experience into rules, routines and procedures,
which persists beyond the initial historical
moment and conditions. Moreover, this approach
does not explain why some leftist governments
that should have incentives to reform previously
repressive regimes have not initiated reforms.
Governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador,
Bolivia, Brazil and Chile have advanced very
modest reforms of the security sector. At the
same time, in most Latin American countries,
intelligence services used by military regimes to
repress the opposition have not been reformed,
suggesting that there are some areas that
democratic authorities are not willing to touch.
The failure to advance reforms is essentially a
political problem; thus our analysis needs to include
such a dimension. In a democratic setting,
incumbents face pressure to simultaneously
reduce crime, maintain the stability of the
country, and protect citizens’ rights. Moreover,
governments want to keep themselves in power
by advocating policies that are appealing to their
electorate, and currently, citizens are very
concerned with both the protection of their
rights and their protection from insecurity. The
story becomes more complex when we observe
that in many cases within the region those who
control the monopoly of force are linked to
criminal networks. So, it is very likely that
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citizens would request, to authorities, hardline
policies against delinquents, and by doing so they
would increase the power of institutions that are
directly involved in such illegal behaviours.
In defining the issue of security, political actors
are likely to frame it as a trade-off between
liberty and security – between individual rights
and security powers (Della Porta 1996).
Politicians tend to see the problem of public
safety as a zero-sum game; that is, what citizens
gain in security by increasing security
institutions powers, they will lose in liberty
through the restriction of individual rights.
In this context, two groups are likely to emerge:
a pro-order coalition requesting hardline policies in
favour of the protection of property and against
delinquency, violence and crime, and a pro-civil
rights coalition, advocating protection of human
rights against state abuses. If the pro-order
coalition has the power and ability to frame
security threats as a main concern of society, the
status quo is likely to prevail. In contrast, if the
civil rights coalition has the power and ability to
frame the protection of individual rights as a
main social concern, then, governments will
engage in reforms to transform the police and
other security institutions.
In the political arena, we observe these two
competing coalitions trying to advance their
agendas. The civil rights coalition may include
lawyers, human rights organisations, politicians
generally identified with liberal and leftist ideas,
and some career state officials that are likely to
support the notion that every citizen has basic
unalienable rights, even in cases in which a
society is dealing with crime, terrorism and
social disorder. The most active groups are
human rights advocacy networks attempting to
convince other social and political actors of the
need to advance people’s rights. Advocacy
networks are defined here as organisations
characterised by voluntary, reciprocal and
horizontal patterns of communication and
exchange, including international and domestic
non-governmental research and advocacy
organisations, local social movements,
foundations, the media, parts of regional and
international intergovernmental organisations
and parts of the executive and/or parliamentary
branches of governments (Keck and Sikkink
1998).
The other side of the coin is the pro-order
coalition, whose primary concern is the
maintenance of social order. In many countries,
the police, intelligence agencies, some state
officials, more conservative political parties,
relevant sectors of the business community and
some sectors of civil society tend to champion
this view. These actors will seek to provide
security institutions with a wide range of legal
tools to pre-empt social disorder, terrorism and
crime. Those sectors do not reject the existence
of individual rights, but they emphasise that
such rights should be circumstantial and that
authorities must restrict citizens’ rights and
widen security institutions powers in order to
maintain social peace.
The two coalitions are not necessarily unified or
highly coordinated, being usually held together
by informal ties among actors and groups of
society that share a common view. What is
important here is the observance of some
minimum level of coordination among them.
They are generally linked by past experiences
and/or membership in specific organisations.
Their latent interests achieve greatest
coordination in crucial junctures, such as when a
case achieves public notoriety or when a
prominent bill affecting these groups is debated
in Congress.
From a political viewpoint, the pro-order
coalition has a comparative advantage over the
civil rights coalition. Coordination for the pro-
order coalition is easier given its prior support
from established institutions, such as the police
or armed forces. Civil rights groups are less
likely to have bureaucratic institutions defending
their positions. Bureaucratic institutions, such as
the police have comparative advantages over
voluntary organisations, because they can use the
financial resources they receive to lobby, and the
costs of mobilisation are lower than they are for
voluntary organisations (Lowery et al. 2002).
Police reforms in Latin America provide concrete
examples of how political actors react to security
issues. As a government initiates a given reform,
police institutions may attempt to influence
politicians and the general public, suggesting
that any increase in crime is the direct result
those ‘ineffective’ reforms. If the perception of
public insecurity rises, governments are more
willing to listen to police institutions, increasing
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the chances of a restriction in the scope of the
reforms and/or a re-establishment of police
powers. Because the civil rights coalition has
more coordination problems than the pro-order
coalition, it is hard for them to articulate an
immediate response to this proposed new wave of
counter-reforms. Given the inequality of
resources of power between these two coalitions,
we should expect that even in cases in which
governments accept reforms, they tend to be
mild and face serious problems in the policy
implementation process.
The reform of the police in Argentina is a prime
example of such an infrastructure of incentives.
When a journalist asked Argentina’s former
Secretary of Justice and Safety, León Arslanián,
whether proposing hardline measures would
deliver more votes in an election, Arslanián did
not hesitate to respond ‘Yes, I believe so’.1
Arslanián led one of the most comprehensive
attempts to reform a police force in
contemporary Latin America in the mid-1990s.
His attempt failed because of the strong
institutional and political resistance from a
powerful pro-order coalition as well as a simple
electoral factor; proposing ‘tough’ punitive
measures against delinquency is a strategy that
many politicians are likely to use because
citizens are likely to view it favourably. This
seems to be the case in many Latin American
countries and in democracies in general. Indeed,
the French National Assembly adopted a
sweeping anti-crime law in early February 2004,
giving prosecutors and the police new power to
fight organised crime, including the extension
from two to four days the period in which
suspects can be detained and questioned without
charges against them.2
So, what explains resistance to change in
security institutions is a structure of incentives
favouring those who want to maintain the status
quo. As ‘citizens’ safety’ is highly valued by
policymakers, security forces and their allies in
the political system have more room to
manoeuvre the policies that are likely to be
implemented. Even in political systems that are
more favourable to human rights advocacy
groups, and even when a ‘window of opportunity’
to gain allies and influence the policy process
presents itself to these groups, the possibilities
for successful reform are likely to be
counterbalanced by a generally well-organised
pro-order coalition. My previous work (Fuentes
2004) suggests that advocacy groups may
effectively impact agenda setting in some critical
junctures but that their impact on policy
implementation and police practices is likely to
be, at best, transitory. In sum, the task of
enhancing individual rights is extremely difficult
given a structure of incentives that favours those
who aim to preserve the status quo.
2.2 Society: protecting personal rights at the cost of
violating others’ rights
Politicians respond to their ideals, to political
constraints provided by the political system, and
to their constituencies. In a democratic context,
what society expects from politicians is relevant.
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Table 1 To capture delinquents, should authorities respect rules or can they act outside the rules?*
Acting outside the rules 2008 (%)
Argentina 37.3
Bolivia 38.1
Brazil 28.9
Chile 48.6
Honduras 52.2
Mexico 30.1
Uruguay 49.8
Latin America Average 38.7
*Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey of 18 countries with selected countries shown here.
Vanderbilt University, http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/links (accessed 28 November 2008)
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We know that policy decisions do not depend
entirely on social perceptions. In other words,
policymakers make decisions considering a set of
factors, including citizens’ perceptions of security.
If security institutions act outside the rule of law
as many scholars have documented, we should
expect citizens to have a critical view of security
institutions. However, this is not what we find in
comparative surveys. In general, public opinion
surveys across Latin America show higher
respect for military and police institutions than
for politicians and traditional democratic
institutions, such as Congress.3
Moreover, when asked whether authorities
should respect the rules or act outside the rules,
approximately 40 per cent of the Latin American
population on average is willing to accept
authorities acting outside the rules to control
crime (Table 1). It is interesting that even in
highly institutionalised countries, such as Chile
and Uruguay, a high percentage of the
population think that maintaining order should
prevail over the acceptance of rules.
A dramatic example of the complexities of
citizens’ perceptions on security issues can be
found in Argentina. Although this country made
important legal reforms regarding the protection
of individual rights during the 1990s, the actual
record of police practices illustrates the
difficulties in implementing such rights. Since
the re-establishment of democracy in 1983,
several international and independent national
sources have denounced serious violations of
human rights by police forces, focusing on two
related illegitimate practices: officers’ illegal
practices in order to obtain private benefits by
using their positions of power – that is,
corruption – and practices of violence against the
population.
Moreover, several press sources and specialists
have revealed the existence of a complex
network of illegal businesses led by police
officers and political brokers in different districts
of Buenos Aires province. This network included
profiting from prostitution and illegal gambling,
trafficking of stolen cars, kidnapping, trafficking
of police reports, and drug trafficking. The
network continues to be a ‘ladder of illegality’
that extends from street-level police officers and
districts’ political brokers to top-ranking officers,
politicians and businessmen (Oliveira and
Tiscornia 1998; Dutil and Ragendorfer 1997;
Saín 2001).
We should expect that this well-documented
evidence would make citizens more supportive of
police reforms. Indeed, in relation to the image
of the police, citizens in the province show a
relatively constant pattern of distrust for the
police. Surveys in the early 1990s demonstrate
that an average of only 24 per cent of people
living in the province have a positive image of
the provincial police (Table 2). On average, more
than 60 per cent of respondents had a regular or
negative image of the police.
In 1996 and in a context of growing public
awareness of police scandals, citizens perceived
abuses as a structural problem. For instance,
57 per cent of respondents in the capital and the
province believed that police abuses were an
institutional characteristic of the police, and only
34 per cent considered them to be due solely to
individual carelessness.4 By the year 2000, 80 per
cent of respondents in the Buenos Aires province
had a neutral or negative image of the police,
while only 16 per cent had a positive image
(Catterberg 2000).5 Moreover, surveys conducted
by the Argentine Ministry of Justice in the late
1990s confirmed previous trends. When citizens
were asked to evaluate police work, more than
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Table 2 Argentina: Public opinion perceptions of the police, 1991–3*
March/May (1991) March/May (1993)
Federal Police Buenos Aires Province Police Federal Police Buenos Aires Province Police
Positive 27.6 25 32 35.2
Regular 34.1 38.8 31.3 29.2
Negative 37.1 33.6 30 32.8
*Surveys conducted by Centro de Estudios Unión para la Neuva Mayoria (CEUNM). 
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50 per cent of respondents in the province said
that ‘they don’t do a good job’ (Table 3).
However, in Argentina citizens are highly divided
regarding the trade-off between citizens’ rights
and public safety. Surveys conducted in Buenos
Aires province in 1998 and 2000 show that,
despite the fact that citizens tend to have a
negative perception of the police, almost half are
in favour of giving the police more powers to
fight crime.6
While 49.3 per cent of respondents from lower
classes support increasing powers of the police,
middle and upper classes tend to be less
supportive of such an option (43.1 per cent). This
is consistent with other surveys that show that
people from the lower class and with lower levels
of education have a better opinion of the police
than people from the middle and upper classes
with higher levels of education and who are
centre-left.7
This case demonstrates the complexities of the
story of reinforcing the rule of law in democratic
contexts. Those who distrust police institutions
because they are corrupt or do not perform
adequately also suggest increasing their powers.
2.3 Security sector institutions: legacies and
patrimonial incentives
Another complementary approach toward the
lack of change in Latin America is the
institutional development of the security forces
within the region. Some approaches have argued
that the maintenance of certain institutional
features characteristic of a military regime have
had an enormous impact on issues such as
violence (Chevigny 1995; Méndez 1999). In this
sense, the military has played a crucial role
within society. Examples of such militarisation
are the placement of police institutions within
ministries of defence in several countries
including Brazil, Chile and Colombia, the
prosecution of police crimes under special
military courts, and the assignment of military
officers to police tasks. Moreover, as the police’s
main task in the past was to defend the regime
from ‘enemies’, national security doctrines
blurred the distinctions among criminals,
terrorists, political opposition and poor sectors of
society (Holston and Caldeira 1998; Neild 2000).
Overall, authoritarian legacies have reinforced
repressive and social control functions of the
police and weakened the rule of law. Security
institutions are often considered to be insulated
corporate institutions, resisting any reform
attempts (Méndez 1999: 22). Unchecked security
forces with inherited institutional and legal
privileges from past regimes explain the
maintenance of police violence and the
resistance to change of security institutions.
A complementary argument suggests another
causal mechanism. Here, security officers and
incumbents are embedded in unlawful and
patrimonialistic behaviour; that is, both public
authorities and police officers use their positions
and authority to achieve private benefits, creating
a complex network of patronage (Hartlyn 1998).
Chaotic, violent, and rule-less politics is
explained by low levels of civic competence and
democratic understanding on the part of mass
constituencies and, equally important, high levels
of corruption, mistrust, and abuse of power on
the part of competing politicians.
One may argue that this is due to a combination
of factors such as weak mechanisms of
accountability over security institutions, so
officers perceive they will not be punished, and
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Table 3 Argentina: Evaluation of police work 1999–2000 (Buenos Aires Capital and Province)*
1999 2000
Federal Police Buenos Aires Province Police Federal Police Buenos Aires Province Police
Do a good job 36.1 35 36.7 32.5
Don’t do a good job 49.4 51.9 45.6 51.3
Didn’t answer 14.4 13.1 17.7 16.2
*The 1998 survey was carried out on a representative sample of 2001 citizens; the 1999 survey on 5,611; and the
2000 survey on 3,601 interviews (Ministerio de Justicia 2002). 
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incumbents not willing to punish abusive police
officers given the mutually beneficial relationship
between those incumbents and corrupt officers.
Thus, the status quo is explained not by the
existence of legal provisions allowing police
autonomy, but by a given social equilibrium
favourable to certain groups of society. The lack
of accountability is the mechanism allowing the
persistence of such patterns.
3 Conclusions
Returning to the central argument, this article
suggests that observing political conditions is
essential in order to understand why so little has
been done in the security sector realm in Latin
America. Crucial areas, such as intelligence,
police internal affairs, military procurement and
military training are untouched areas of reform
in most Latin American countries.
I suggest that the combination of a structure of
political incentives, as previously described, has
inhibited political actors to take action in this
relevant sector. Even leftist political sectors are
not willing to engage in deep transformations
due to involvement with patrimonial institutions,
daily demands from civil society to reduce
violence by increasing the powers of security
forces and electoral demands to control
delinquency and crime.
Can civil society do something about this
situation? Is there a space for pro-civil rights
actors in this story? Latin American countries
require more far-reaching and in-depth
democratic politics. This includes institutional
reforms to make the decision-making process
more transparent and to empower citizens; that
is, to place citizens in control of what
government agencies do (or do not do).
Given the described context, advocacy networks
(local and international) can play a crucial role
by monitoring security institutions’ practices,
checking legal procedures and monitoring policy
implementation. Advocacy networks are more
likely to be influential under the following four
conditions: when like-minded groups cooperate
with each other to overcome ideological and
political differences; when groups gain a positive
public reputation; when groups gain allies
domestically and abroad; and, finally, when
groups are able to mobilise public opinion
(Fuentes 2006).
Establishing mechanisms of accountability is an
extremely difficult task, even in advanced
democracies (Warren 1991). Although security
institutions are likely to reject civilian
interference in internal affairs, politicians are
likely to support such institutions if the
population considers that tough measures
against crime should be top priority or if there
are vested interests between politicians and such
institutions. Thus, transforming security
institutions does not only depend on proactive
activists but on the set of political factors
described previously.
Consequently, pro-civil rights groups face several
challenges. First, strategies that may work well in
an authoritarian context may not be adequate in
a democratic regime. Democratic authorities
have a set of legal and political tools to pre-empt
and respond to criticism domestically and
internationally. In general, democratic
authorities have depicted allegations of violence
conducted by security institutions as the
exception rather than the rule. Moreover,
authorities are likely to argue that domestic
institutional mechanisms will eventually solve
misconduct. Advocacy groups – both locally and
internationally – have continued to use a strategy
that addresses allegations on a case-by-case basis.
The experience of Argentina demonstrates that
while denouncing specific cases is a crucial
strategy in order to gain legitimacy, this should
be combined with proposing institutional
reforms, because institutional mechanisms to
deal with abuses in Latin America are weak and
lack both transparency and adherence to basic
principles of fairness.
Second, gathering reliable information locally
and disseminating it internationally is a crucial
strategy in ‘making the case’ of the need for
reform. Advocacy groups can become a relevant
focal point for civil rights organisations as well as
for public officials if they become good at
collecting information.
Third, gaining a better understanding of their
political and institutional contexts may help
advocacy networks to advance their agenda.
Especially if these groups face a well-organised
pro-order coalition, they should seek to frame
the issue of citizens’ rights as complementary –
rather than detrimental – to the protection of
public safety.
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Finally, advocacy networks should improve their
capacity to monitor legislative debates and
develop alliances with policymakers, the
academic community and technical experts to
generate a more persistent influence over the
policy process. Social actors need to offer
plausible policy alternatives and monitor the
implementation of policy outcomes. As crime is
likely to be a central concern in developing
countries, and as citizens are likely to be
supportive of a ‘tough on crime’ approach, the
main challenge for local and international
advocacy groups today is how to contest the ‘iron
fist’ discourse in new and innovative ways.
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Notes
1 ‘Conducir no es leer encuestas y correr’,
Página 12, 6 August 1999.
2 ‘Lawyers Protest Across France at Sweeping
Anticrime Law’, New York Times, 12 February
2004, p. A11.
3 The 2008 LAPOP survey (18 countries) shows
that the level of confidence in institutions as
follows (adding 5, 6 and 7 in a scale from 1 to
7 when 7 means ‘A lot’): Armed Forces 55.5
per cent, the President 43.9 per cent, the
police 36.3 per cent, unions 25.4 per cent and
political parties 21 per cent.
4 Survey conducted by CEUNM based on
random representative sample of 1,000 adults.
These findings and those reported in the
other surveys cited attained acceptable levels
of statistical significance. All the surveys were
carried out in Buenos Aires capital or province
or both.
5 Survey conducted by Catterberg and Assoc.
6 Two surveys confirm this trend. In 1998, when
respondents were asked whether police forces
should have more powers to fight crime, 44.7
per cent supported this claim, while 48
rejected it (survey conducted by CEUNM). In
2000, when respondents were asked the same
question, 45.4 per cent supported increasing
police powers while 52 per cent rejected it
(survey conducted by Catterberg and Assoc.).
7 Surveys conducted between 1998 and 2001
confirm that lower-class sectors have a
comparatively better opinion of the police
than upper-class sectors. See Centro de
Documentación, CEUNM.
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